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The Politics of Identity and 
Notions of Home: How Serbian 
Londoners Perceived Brexit
Sanja Vico
ABSTRACT: This paper looks at the attitudes of Serbian Londoners to Brexit and at 
the motives behind their voting decisions at the 2016 EU referendum in Britain. It 
aims to understand why these people voted the way they did and what this means 
for their identities and their sense of belonging. Based on two-year-long ethno-
graphic research and in-depth interviews with forty Serbian Londoners, this paper 
finds that Serbian Londoners were divided on Brexit and that economic status and 
income were not the most important factors for understanding voting decisions, 
but rather social and cultural capital. Their differences in attitudes to Brexit and 
degrees of openness to others can further be explained by Bonikowski’s (2017) 
argument that there may be a common repertoire of dispositions towards the na-
tion that transcends national boundaries, which explains similarities in national-
isms among different countries. The paper also considers whether Spivak’s (1987) 
concept of strategic essentialism can be applied to understanding how Serbian 
Londoners perceived Brexit. Finally, it sheds light on the ambivalent role of living 
in London – both a cosmopolitan and a British city – and what impact this may 
have on these participants’ sense of belonging.
KEYWORDS: Brexit, identity, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, migration, Serbian 
Londoners, social class
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Brexit, Migration and National Identity
Studies of public opinion in Britain in the years prior to the EU referendum in June 
2016, and in the wake of the vote, show that immigration was a key issue in decid-
ing the June 2016 referendum result (Clarke, Goodwin & Whiteley, 2017). Even in 
the months after the vote, it was scoring high on the list of main worries for the UK 
adult population. In August 2016, the UK was reported to be the most concerned 
with immigration among the countries surveyed by Ipsos MORI (2016). 
There has also been an evident hierarchy in terms of how people from different 
European countries are perceived. A study by Fox et al. (2015) shows that Hungari-
ans and Romanians in Bristol face discrimination based on their Eastern European 
origin. This is also supported by YouGov (March 2017) data that shows Romanians 
are very negatively viewed in Britain, unlike, for instance, North Americans and 
Germans. What seems to have dominated this discussion on immigration in the 
wake of the Brexit vote in the UK is arguably social class (see Vico, 2017). Fox et al. 
(2015) find that Hungarians and Romanians in Bristol often present themselves 
as belonging to a higher social class as a strategy for coping with discrimination. 
In line with this, YouGov’s data from March 2017 shows there is a sharp contrast 
between how the British public perceives high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants. 
While the majority look favourably at immigration of high-skilled professionals, 
they think the immigration of low-skilled workers should be limited. 
The European Social Survey (ESS) of attitudes in seventeen countries towards 
immigration based on race/ethnicity and wealth demonstrates that the British are 
less accepting of migrants from poorer countries (47% against) than of migrants 
of different ethnic origin (41% against), and in this respect Britain is less willing to 
accept less well-off immigrants than most other surveyed countries (the average 
is 41% against) (Clarke, Goodwin & Whiteley, 2017, p. 223). If we consider all these 
different insights, we conclude that the “problem” is deemed to be the migration 
of the less well-off, and, based on this criterion, immigrants from particular Euro-
pean countries. Announced and implemented policies provide further evidence in 
this regard. The £35,000 earnings threshold for non-EU immigrants in order to set-
tle in the UK was introduced in April 2016 (Ferguson, 2016), while, in an interview 
on HARDtalk in October 2016, Conservative MP Iain Duncan Smith said that only 
academics, software engineers and comparable others would be welcome, and 
GJSS Vol. 15, Issue 138
the earning threshold for non-EU nationals gaining a work permit also rose from 
£30,000 to £50,000 in January 2018 (Wright, 2018).
The narrow victory of Brexiteers, as well as several protests held in London 
and initiatives and petitions against Brexit, shed light on how the nation was di-
vided and polarized on this issue. Many studies of Brexit seem to suggest that so-
cial class – particularly income and education – and age category were important 
determinants of EU referendum voting patterns (Antonucci, Horvath, Kutiyski & 
Krouwel, 2017; Clarke, Goodwin & Whiteley, 2017; Hobolt, 2016; Ford & Goodwin, 
2017). Sara Hobolt finds in her research that there was “a clear educational divide 
in the Brexit vote. …Only a quarter of people with a postgraduate degree voted 
to leave, whereas over two-thirds of those with no qualifications did so” (2016, p. 
1269). Ford and Goodwin also state that Brexit voters were mainly working-class, 
with few educational qualifications (2017, p. 26). Other studies, however, dismiss 
this argument and claim that people who belong to the so-called squeezed mid-
dle class, whose economic status has been in decline, were the more likely Leave 
voters (Antonucci, Horvath, Kutiyski & Krouwel, 2017). Antonucci et al. challenge 
the portrayal of the Brexit voter as “left behind” or as an “angry globalisation los-
er” belonging to the working class, and find that a significant proportion of Leave 
voters were middle-class people with an intermediate level of education, but a 
declining financial situation (2017, pp. 212–213). These discussions of the driving 
force behind Brexit have put more emphasis on the economic status of voters than 
on their cultural positioning. 
The people of one nation may not share the same dispositions towards the 
nation. What being British means to UKIP members and supporters may not be 
the same as for the Liberal Democrats, for example (cf. Mihelj, 2011, p. 18). National 
identity is never completely uncontested and has no uniform meaning (e.g. see 
Hall, 1990; Gilroy, 1987; Morley, 1992). “Rather than assuming that nations possess 
core values shared by most citizens … the nation’s meaning [is] … constructed 
and fragmented” (Bonikowski, 2017, p.148); thus, there may be more similarities 
between people from different countries than within one nation. Bart Bonikowski 
states that it would be wrong to assume that national cultures are coherent; rath-
er, all national identities are heterogeneous and contested to some extent and in 
some contexts (2017, p. 149). By looking closely at nationalist sentiments in France 
and Germany, Bonikowski concludes that:
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the similarities in nationalism across the two counties suggest that there may 
exist a common repertoire of dispositions towards the nation that transcends 
national boundaries… a French citizen is likely to imagine the nation in a man-
ner more consistent with a similarly disposed German citizen than with another 
French compatriot… (2017, p. 164)
The question of Serbian national identity has always been deeply divisive (see 
Gordy, 2013). After the Second World War, people in this region were divided into 
Chetniks and Partisans, the former in support of the monarchy and identifying 
themselves as Serbs, and the latter backing the real-socialist regime in Yugoslavia 
and describing themselves as Yugoslavs. Since the fall of Yugoslavia at the begin-
ning of the 1990s and a resurgence of nationalism in the region, this division into 
communists and Chetniks (royalists) has become much more ambiguous and has 
largely been replaced by the division into “First Serbia” and “Other Serbia” (see 
Gordy, 2013; Russell-Omaljev, 2016;), whereby “First Serbia” or nationalist Serbia 
refers to supporters of Milosević’s regime in the 1990s, while “Other Serbia” refers 
to the opponents of that regime and represented ‘civic’ Serbia (and often upheld 
a cosmopolitan outlook).
The social class has also played a prominent role in migration studies and 
was used as one of the key factors to understanding how migrants go about their 
lives in host societies. For instance, Val Colic-Peisker (2008) explains differences 
between Croatians in Australia and America mainly on the basis of their class 
and income. On these grounds, Colic-Peisker (2008) distinguishes between ‘eth-
nic transnationalism’ and ‘cosmopolitan transnationalism’, whereby the former 
is common among working class Croatian diaspora whose lives revolve around 
ethnicity, and the latter among the middle class diaspora who is oriented to their 
careers. Recognising this importance of social class in migration studies and the 
studies of ‘Brexit’, this paper draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) theory of three 
types of capital – economic, cultural and social, to discuss the class backgrounds 
of Serbian Londoners and to analyse what role, if any, class has played in their 
voting choice in the 2016 EU referendum. Bourdieu defines economic capital in 
relation to a person’s wealth, whereas cultural capital refers to a range of symbol-
ic markers such as taste preferences, education and dialects, and social capital 
comprises a person’s connections and social ties (1986, p. 47). Bourdieu draws 
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on the cultural capital thesis to explain differences among students from differ-
ent class backgrounds. His aim is to show that academic success and failure was 
not merely based on natural dispositions, even when students from different 
backgrounds have equal access to a good education. Important for this cultural 
capital, according to Bourdieu, is that “it always remains marked by its earlier 
acquisition…” (1986, p. 49).
Starting from there, in this paper, I discuss the motives of Serbian Londoners 
for emigrating to and settling in London. For instance, Ivana Bajic-Hajdukovic notes 
that the migration of Serbs to London before 1990 was political, whereas after 
1990 it was economic (2008, pp. 30, 46). An economic migrant is an individual who 
moves from one country to another in order to improve their economic and profes-
sional prospects. Hence, the term can effectively be applied to a banker as much as 
to a low-skilled construction worker. However, the term economic migrant is most 
often used to refer to the latter – a low-skilled or unskilled person from a develop-
ing or underdeveloped country (Semmelroggen, 2015). Meanwhile, lifestyle migra-
tion mainly refers to the relatively affluent and privileged, who usually move from 
urban areas to rural or coastline areas (Benson & Osbaldison, 2014) or to less busy 
and “human-sized” cities such as Berlin (Griffiths & Maile, 2014) in search of a better 
way of life (Benson & O’Reilly, 2009; Benson & O’Reilly, 2015). Some other migra-
tion studies challenge any neat class categorisation of migrants, pointing out that 
some highly qualified people take low-skilled occupations in the new host country 
(Madianou & Miller, 2012; Parutis, 2011), while others dismiss migration categories 
altogether as “categorical fetishism” (Crawleya & Skleparisb, 2018).
Given that a desire to put a cap on immigration was one of the key motives be-
hind the Leave vote and that, Eastern European migrants in Britain have particu-
larly been viewed unfavourably, as already explained, , I consider Gayatri Chakra-
vorty Spivak’s (1987) concept of strategic essentialism and Iris Marion Young’s 
(1990) arguments on the ideal of city life in order to analyse and understand both 
attitudes of Serbian Londoners to Brexit, and whether and in what ways Brexit may 
have impacted their sense of belonging. Strategic essentialism refers to a temporal 
strategy undertaken by marginalised and discriminated groups aimed at mobilis-
ing and reinforcing their group identity and group solidarity in order to claim po-
litical recognition and subvert politics of marginalisation and discrimination (Spi-
vak, 1987; Naficy, 1999; Georgiou, 2012). In her later work, however, Spivak (1989) 
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refutes this strategy of essentialising identity, because it follows the norms of the 
system that it aims to challenge (see Danius & Jonsson, 1993, p. 43). 
On the other hand, Young argues that city life affirms group difference and 
hence offers a credible alternative perspective beyond the dichotomy between lib-
eral individualism and communitarianism (Young, 2011 [1990], p. 226–227). Young 
criticises liberal individualism for putting too much emphasis on individuals and 
neutral standards, thereby disguising the fact that these are the standards of the 
privileged and that there is an inherent bias towards norms; it disregards persist-
ing underlying inequalities. However, she also contests “the ideal of community” 
and finds it oppressive insofar as it requires all of its members to conform to the 
norm, seeking to reduce similarities to sameness. Therefore, both liberal individ-
ualism and communitarianism in different ways dismiss social differences. Con-
versely, city life, as “the being together of strangers” (Young, 2011, p. 237), implies 
“openness to unassimilated otherness” (p. 227). Indeed, city life allows people to 
be exposed to different perspectives, to public spaces that enable encounters and 
interactions with people who hold different opinions or belong to different ethnic 
or cultural groups, and to different aesthetics (p. 240). 
London’s quirky, cosmopolitan and multinational character has arguably at-
tracted more professionals among the group studied and has encouraged a cos-
mopolitan outlook. On the other hand, as Benedict Anderson (1992) notes, the 
juxtaposition of people holding different passports living cheek by jowl can also 
create a climate that nurtures long-distance nationalism. Hence, this paper will 
also shed light on the role of London in shaping the identities of these partici-
pants, and their attitudes to migration and more generally to otherness.
It is important to take all these different perspectives into account in order to 
understand the bigger picture of how Serbian Londoners perceived the Brexit vote 
and what it means for their identities and notions of home. As explained, a tur-
bulent recent history in the region of the former Yugoslavia, including the legacy 
of communism, nationalist outbreaks and the civil war, as well as the constant 
decomposition of borders in the Western Balkans, democratic transition, and 
the current endeavours of these countries to join the EU, have all meant that the 
question of identity is deeply contentious for this group. Drawing on Bronikowski 
(2017), however, I argue that there are differences among the people of any nation 
with respect to their repertoires of dispositions towards the nation and that these 
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transcend national boundaries. This means that we may well find more similari-
ties between similarly disposed Serbian and English voters in the 2016 EU refer-
endum than among Serbian Londoners themselves. Given that social class seems 
to have played a crucial role in the referendum result, it is also important to first 
discuss class backgrounds and motives for migration among this group, in order 
to understand whether the existing debates on Brexit apply to them. Thus, this pa-
per aims to contribute to a wider discussion of Brexit, as well as to migration stud-
ies, by supplementing these with novel insights, and thereby contribute to a more 
holistic picture of Brexit and London’s migrant population. Finally, it is important 
to acknowledge that London predominantly voted Remain. Thus, I consider below 
the role of London in shaping the identities of this group and their sense of belong-
ing post-Brexit. Before proceeding with the analysis of findings, I first explain how 
this research was carried out.
Methodology
This two-year-long ethnographic research project, including online ethnography 
and semi-structured in-depth interviews, complemented by media maps, was 
conducted with 40 participants in the period between July 2015 and July 2017. 
An equal number of men and women were recruited, all of whom had lived in 
London for at least two years prior to summer 2015 when this research com-
menced. The sample was also evenly divided into three waves of migration 
which were identified in a pilot study carried out prior to this formal research. 
These three waves are 1945–1990; 1990–2003; and 2003–2013. Other factors such 
as age, profession, class, gender and generation were also taken into account 
when analysing the data. The participants were recruited through the snowball 
technique on the basis of their self-identification as Serbs and included both 
first- and second-generation of migrants. Importantly, these participants came 
from different regions and republics of the former Yugoslavia: Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, and Macedonia. There were also participants 
who were born in the UK and some who had lived in different places around the 
world before they settled in London. I borrow Susan Ossman’s (2013) term “se-
rial migrants” to refer to the group of people who had changed several places 
before settling in London, although my application of the term differs in other 
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characteristics from Ossman’s (2013) original meanings, as will be explained in 
the next section.
Given that we live our lives both online and offline, with these constituting 
a seamless continuum in people’s lives, we bring our “offline” lives into “online” 
spaces, and vice versa (see Murthy, 2008, p. 849; Miller & Slater, 2000), I have on 
a daily basis observed and participated in both offline and online activities and 
interactions with my research participants on social networking sites such as Face-
book, Twitter and Instagram. In interviews, the participants were asked to show me 
some of their interactions on instant messaging platforms such as Viber and What-
sApp, but some of the most revealing insights emerged spontaneously from ethno-
graphic fieldwork – while “hanging out” with people in their “natural” settings. The 
participants selected what interactions they wanted to show me, and they would 
show me only the latest threads of messages, so my ability as a researcher to thor-
oughly examine this type of personal interaction was to some degree limited.
Thematic and discourse analyses were applied to interpret the data. I identi-
fied six patterns (central themes) in practices and interviews, implicit and explicit 
(Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 10), which were both data-led (the coding was led by the 
topics that emerged from the data) and theory-led (the coding was guided by the 
theoretical framework). These were: London as British, London as cosmopolitan, 
cultural change, mobility, traditionalists, ‘glocalisation’ (Robertson, 1995). I also 
created typologies in order to describe people belonging to each of the three iden-
tified waves and the subgroups within these waves (see Berg, 2006).
Findings and Analysis
Serbian Londoners
There are about 70,000 Serbs living in Greater London today, according to some 
estimates (Serbian Council of Great Britain), but there are no official statistics. Most 
of the Serbs in the UK live in London (some other widely populated places would 
be Leicester, Birmingham, Derby and Bradford), especially more recent arrivals. 
As this two-year long ethnographic research study shows, there is no one single 
Serbian community in London. Their different personal and family histories and 
backgrounds make this group remarkably diverse and complex. There are scien-
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tists, journalists, librarians, academics, hairdressers, surveyors, architects, artists, 
doctors, economists, bankers, civil servants, students, unemployed, secondary 
school teachers, security guards, waiters, marketing professionals, and so forth. 
As already mentioned, they come from most of the republics of the former Yugo-
slavia, while some participants were born in the UK, and others were born or had 
lived in other places before they settled in London, such as Latin America, the US, 
other European countries, Africa and Asia. 
Nor is there one geographically bounded space in London that they occupy. 
More recent arrivals, since roughly 2003, have increasingly become very scattered 
around London. Although most earlier arrivals – before 1990 or during the 1990s 
– predominantly settled in areas of West London such as Ladbroke Grove, Notting 
Hill, Shepherds Bush, Ealing and Acton, today Serbs live in many different areas, 
such as Battersea, Clapham Common, Putney, Richmond, Highgate, Blackheath, 
Honor Oak, Shoreditch, Crystal Palace and South Kensington.
Other migration studies have also contested the notion of diaspora as a ho-
mogenous group and have documented the diversity among migrants of the same 
origin (see Ong & Cabanes, 2011; Sreberny, 2000). Annabelle Sreberny shows there 
is no one single Iranian ‘community’ in London; Iranians living in London are both 
geographically spread and internally diverse (2000, p. 185). Sreberny finds that Ira-
nians of different political affiliations and class backgrounds tend to congregate 
around different areas in London, whereby they constitute multiple local Iranian 
communities, often dependent on a specific area of London, such as Harrow Ira-
nian Community Centre (2000, p.186). In the case of Serbian Londoners, I have not 
found the location in London to be the main organising principle of Serbian ‘com-
munities’ in London. In fact, many of my participants, particularly more recent ar-
rivals, do not belong to any Serbian organisation or community centre in London.
Most media and migration studies have emphasised the important role of gen-
erational identities of migrants, as well as their gender and age in the ways they 
identify (Georgiou, 2006; Gillepsie, 1995). While different class, professional, age, 
gender, regional and generational identities of Serbian Londoners are all relevant 
to understanding their attitudes, repertoires of dispositions towards the nation, 
and lifestyles, their motives for migration, triggered by some major events in their 
countries of origin, have the most significant explanatory potential. Communism 
(i.e. real-socialism) in the former Yugoslavia, then the civil war and the break-up 
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of the country, followed by international sanctions and NATO bombing, then the 
democratic transition after 2000, the opening of borders, and the start of negotia-
tions on EU membership, were all major events that triggered different motives 
for migration. Based on this, I have identified three dominant waves of migration 
of Serbs to London. The first wave includes people who arrived in Britain after the 
Second World War and up to 1990, the second wave refers to those who came in 
the 1990s and shortly after, while the third wave is comprised of those who came 
to London after 2003.
Each of these waves is also internally diverse. As Figure 1 shows, within the first 
wave I have identified three groups of Serbian Londoners: royalists or Chetniks 
are people who were considered enemies of the state and were political refugees 
or asylum seekers shortly after the end of WWII; ‘young adventure seekers’, usu-
ally people in their twenties who travelled around Europe in the 1970s and 1980s 
when a Yugoslav passport granted them free entrance to most countries of both 
the West and the East, and who ended up in London.
The second wave was underpinned by the collapse of Yugoslavia and the civil 
war. Hence, unsurprisingly, this period saw the greatest influx of people from this 
region to London, and hence it was also the most heterogeneous wave. Apart 
from the refugees from the war-engulfed zones, this wave also consisted of young 
people from urban areas, mainly Belgrade, some of whom were men who tried to 
avoid conscription and/or the devastating aftermath of the war, while some were 
women who were taking a gap year before starting university and came to London 
to work as au pairs shortly before the outbreak of the war and then remained and 
pursued their education in Britain. Then there are people who arrived in the late 
1990s and up to 2002, dissatisfied with the social, political and economic condi-
tions set against the backdrop of the war and the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. 
They would usually describe themselves as “atypical Serbs” because they do not 
belong to any Serbian organisations or ‘communities’ in London, but also often in 
order to distance themselves from the negative connotations of nationalistic senti-
ments and the civil war.
The third wave of migration is smaller in scope compared to the previous two 
waves, and quite distinctive. These are mainly people younger than 40 who came 
in the period after 2000 to study or to work for international companies, except for 
the few who moved after marrying a UK citizen. 
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Most of the UK-born (second generation) in the sample were from the first 
wave, with the exception of three respondents who were born in the UK but whose 
families returned soon afterwards to Serbia, so they grew up there and came back 
to Britain after university. On the basis of when they came to London, one of these 
was analysed as a first-wave Serbian Londoner, the other two as second-wave and 
third-wave.
The typology of Serbian migration to London developed here differs some-
what from the insights of Ivana Bajic-Hajdukovic’s (2008) and Lidija Mavra’s studies 
of Serbian Londoners. Bajic-Hajdukovic (2008) distinguishes three wavesas 1945–
1970, 1970–1990 and 1990–2000, whereas Mavra (2010) considers the first wave as 
taking place between 1945 and the late 1960s. However, my analysis shows that 
people who arrived in the 1970s, even though they were not political migrants 
seeking asylum, today have much more in common with earlier arrivals than with, 
for instance, people who arrived after 2000. The participants who arrived in the 
early 2000 show much more in common with people who arrived in the late 1990s, 
because their motives for migration were similar. Meanwhile, the more recent ar-
rivals, i.e. those who have come since roughly 2003 are different in their character-
istics and behaviour to the other two identified groups.
As this ethnographic research shows, the old division into royalists and com-
munists has maintained some relevance for the first two waves of the Serbian di-
Figure 1: Typology of waves of migration of Serbs to London
First wave
(1945–1990)
• Royalists (Chetniks)
• Young adventure seekers – the 1970s and 1980s 
• UK-born
Third wave
(2003–2013)
• Students and young professionals
• Married to a UK citizen
Second wave
(1991–2002)
• Refugees and asylum seekers
• Urban youth – early and mid 1990s
• Self-proclaimed “atypical Serbs” –
the late 1990s and early 2000
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aspora in London insofar as there are some people within these two waves who 
still express strong support for the monarchy, while others often express Yugo-nos-
talgia. However, there is not necessarily a sharp line between them, whereas the 
difference between the supporters of the so-called “First” and “Other” Serbias is 
much more prominent.
Categories of migrants and social class revised
Recent studies have demonstrated that the old class system constituted of 
three classes – working class, middle class and upper class – is no longer ten-
able in Britain and has been replaced by a much more complex schema (see 
Savage et al., 2015). The findings of my study also contribute to this altered pic-
ture of social class in twenty-first century Britain. Although most participants 
across the three waves belong to a broadly defined middle class, their econom-
ic capital do not always correspond to their cultural or social capital (Bourdieu, 
1986), and vice versa. Ong and Cabanes (2011) also reveal this discrepancy 
between different types of capitals among elite Filipino migrants in London. 
The authors find that there are differences in economic and symbolic capital 
 among postgraduate Filipino students in London, whereby the self-funded ‘eco-
nomic elite’ is often looked down upon by the Chevening scholars, those with 
more symbolic capital (Ong & Cabanes, 2011, p.213).
This study further shows that traditional categories of migration, such as eco-
nomic and lifestyle migrants, are not entirely applicable to the case of Serbian Lon-
doners, because of the mix of interrelated motives that underpinned their migra-
tion project, as other migration studies also document (see Crawleya & Skleparisb, 
2018; Madianou & Miller, 2012). It then concludes that economic capital was not 
the key indicator of voting intentions among Serbian Londoners in the EU refer-
endum and is not the most important factor for understanding how well these 
migrants integrate into British society. 
Other studies of migration have also revealed that some migrants are over-
qualified for the jobs they undertake in Britain (see Madianou & Miller, 2012; Pa-
rutis, 2011), so there is a disparity between their cultural and economic capital 
(see Bourdieu, 1986). On the other hand, there are examples in my sample of 
people without a higher education degree who managed to start their own busi-
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nesses and by the time of this research had gained considerable economic capital. 
Boundaries are very often blurred and permeable, which often contests some of 
these established categories. 
Bajic-Hajdukovic (2008) posits that the migration of Serbs to London before 
1990 (first wave) was political, whereas after 1990 (second wave) it was economic. 
On the other hand, most of my participants who arrived in the late 1970s and the 
1980s were mainly people in their twenties, most of whom did not have higher 
education degrees, who were travelling around Europe and ended up in London. 
On the basis of their social class they could be considered economic migrants; 
however, their migration project was not necessarily driven by improving their 
economic prospects and finding a job, but rather by having an adventure.
Likewise, it can be argued that the migration after 2003 (third wave) could be 
broadly defined as lifestyle migration. However, in contrast to dominant trends in 
lifestyle migration studies that point to urban migrants moving to rural or coastline 
areas (see Benson & Osbaldison, 2014), or to less busy and more “human-sized” 
cities such as Berlin (Griffiths & Maile, 2014), this research shows an opposite dy-
namic. These people chose London as a big cosmopolitan city with many career 
challenges. As Mila’s (33 years old, third wave) account – talking about her holiday 
in California – illustrates:
It was nice, but I thought I would like California more. I had a plan to move there, 
but I was disappointed. … I liked San Francisco, but it was small compared to 
London. I guess I like London more as I am getting older. I feel at home here. 
Whenever I go abroad, I get bored. … I came to study… I loved people. Every-
body was talking to me in the streets. It happened once that when I was entering 
the tube, someone gave me his ticket because he did not need it. … It’s like Bel-
grade; it is full with people at 3 am. Before, I had been going to Germany every 
summer, and it had always been dead there at 10 pm, and no one ever talked to 
you, or cared about you… So, I completely fell in love with [this] place.
Similarly, Jonathan (36 years old, third wave) was born in the UK, but shortly after-
wards his family moved back to Belgrade. Although they moved around Europe and 
lived for a short time in other places, he spent most of his childhood and adoles-
cence in Belgrade. He studied in Italy and then, in 2006, decided to settle in London:
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It seemed like the best option in terms of what I wanted to do professionally. It 
seemed like the only place where I could find what I wanted to do. I started in a 
small research consultancy and then moved to big media companies.
These insights show us that professional reasons, such as career advancement, 
which are often associated with economic migrants (Semmelroggen, 2015), are 
for these migrants tightly linked to a desire to explore new places and a vibrant 
cultural scene, which are integral parts of the “self-development” and “pursuit of a 
better way of life”, characterise lifestyle migration (Benson & O’Reilly, 2009). 
For second-wave Serbian migrants, especially those described as “atypical 
Serbs” and “urban youth”, socio-cultural reasons for migration such as cultural mi-
lieu in their country of origin, are intrinsically intertwined with political context. 
For example, Liam (47 years old, second wave) came to London in 2001 because 
he could not adjust to the mentality and prevailing public opinion in Serbia, which 
was set against a backdrop of a decade of Milosevic’s regime, international sanc-
tions, NATO bombing and cultural decay. In line with this, Crawleya and Sklepar-
isb also find in their study of Syrian refugees and migrants that their economic 
reasons for migration cannot be understood without reference to the devastating 
conflict and political turmoil in their country of origin (2018, pp. 53–54).
Moreover, there are examples of people from the first and second waves who 
came from smaller towns in the former Yugoslavia mainly for economic reasons, 
but who today – now they have moved up the social ladder – put more emphasis 
on “quality of life” in London. Thus, we need to account for these dynamics and 
fluidity within migration groups, rather than perceiving class and migration cat-
egories as set in stone. As Crawleya and Skleparisb emphasise, “dominant catego-
ries fail to capture adequately the complex relationship between political, social 
and economic drivers of migration or their shifting significance for individuals over 
time and space” (2018, p. 48). Once this has been made clear, we can get a better 
understanding of the role of social class in the Brexit vote and overall identities of 
this group.
Throughout this research, and particularly when respondents were asked 
about their voting intentions in the UK referendum on the EU and/or their opin-
ions on Brexit, it became apparent that their openness to others did not primar-
ily depend on their economic capital, but rather on their system of values, which 
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belonged much more to the domain of cultural and social capital. While the edu-
cation of this group is an important factor, it is less important when taken alone 
than when coupled with their social capital, i.e., social ties and connections. Based 
on insights from fieldwork and interviews with their social circles, such as family, 
friends and co-workers, including analysis of online interactions and social ties, it 
is clear that their family histories play a major role. For example, those who backed 
a more civic or “Other” Serbia were passionate Remainers, whereas those who 
identified more with a nationalistic or “First” Serbia were mainly committed Leav-
ers. Another important factor in this respect was whether they worked for interna-
tional companies or ran their own businesses, with the former case usually related 
to more open viewpoints. For instance, Norman is a second-wave, middle-class 
40-year-old man who came to the UK first in the early 1990s as a teenager. He did 
A levels in England and then moved to London to pursue BA and MA degrees. He 
now runs his own business. Ethnographic research on his online and offline activi-
ties shows his quite salient Serbian identity. He also voted for Brexit, because, in 
his words, his did not like the influence of other cultures on the British tradition.
The politics of identity and notions of home: The ambivalent 
role of London as both a British and a cosmopolitan city
Another important factor to take into account in order to understand the degrees 
of openness and identities among these research participants is whether they 
have lived in other places before moving to London. This is especially the case 
for the third wave and to some extent for the second. There is a noticeable trend 
among these people to identify more with cities than with countries and, at the 
same time, to consider themselves cosmopolitan. I borrow Robertson’s (1995) 
term ‘glocalisation’ to describe this phenomenon when local and global identi-
ties are much more prominent than national (see Beck, 2002). Hence, my appli-
cation of Robertson’s term is somewhat different from his original meaning that 
refers to the incorporation of locality within globalisation, i.e. that global and local 
processes are happening simultaneously, and more similar to David Conradson 
and Dierdre McKay’s (2007) term ‘translocal subjectivities’. ‘Translocal subjectivi-
ties’ implies that most transnational migrants have primary sense of belonging to 
specific places within the nation and to particular people in these locations, such 
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as their, rather than nation-states (Conradson & McKay, 2007, pp. 168–169). In a 
similar vein, Ong and Cabanes find that some Filipino migrants have attachments 
to their hometowns and kinship networks rather than a loyalty to the nation-state 
(2011, p.202). Georgiou, similarly, finds that most of her participants of Arab origin 
in London identify both with a transnational Arab community and as Londoners 
(Georgiou, 2013, p.102). 
Saskia Sassen (2005) also highlights how cities are the spaces where global 
and local directly interact, often bypassing the national. For example, Helen (50 
years old, second wave), who was a strong Remain voter, was born in Belgrade 
and then lived in several other countries in Europe, Africa and the US. She moved 
to London in 1996.
I identify as European. Any sort of nationalist insularity, whether it is Serbian or 
British, is something I really have trouble accepting and identifying with. There 
are several identities that are important to me and actually what is perhaps more 
important to me than countries are cities. There are certain cities that I care 
about, because I lived there or because I have strong links to them. So, one of 
those cities is Belgrade. I feel much more strongly related to Belgrade than I do to 
Serbia because I travelled very little within Serbia itself and when I do go to Serbia 
it is always to Belgrade. And, most of the people I know in Belgrade are people 
I can relate to, who are not insular, who are not xenophobic, who are not racist, 
who are open to the world and world’s culture, who are democratic in outlook 
and who believe in rights of all people regardless of their race, gender, etc. I have 
a strong link to Munich and to Geneva. I don’t like Switzerland. I don’t feel Swiss, 
even though I have a Swiss passport. And I feel very strongly about London.
Mavra (2013) also observes that some Serbs in London identify as European and 
do so in lieu of identifying as Yugoslavs, given that the country no longer exists. 
However, for my participants, as Elena’s account demonstrates, European identity 
signifies a sense of ‘glocalisation’ – urban (local) and cosmopolitan identity. Like-
wise, Mia (40 years old, first wave) was born in the UK, but her family moved back 
to Belgrade when she was two. They returned to England in 1989, when she was 
12, just before political turmoil and the fall of Yugoslavia. She came to London to 
pursue an MSc degree and has stayed ever since. She also voted Remain.
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I think the EU is a good thing. I like the idea of a free movement of labour. … I 
am not concerned about the UK as much as for Europe. I am afraid that the UK 
has not set an example that other countries might follow. The EU is actually 
the only salvation for Serbia, if the EU falls apart, Serbia might go backwards a 
hundred years.
[I am] a Londoner, definitely. I have struggled for a long time about identity, and 
then I realised I don’t have to be a Serbian, or British, or anything. I do not need 
to put myself in a box. I can just be me, and that is why London is basically home 
because everything goes in London, you don’t have to be of a particular nation-
ality, or dress in a particular way, or behave in a particular way.
The juxtaposition of these two quotes from Mia not only provides us with an in-
sight into the motives of people in this group who voted Remain but also shows 
the contextuality of identities (see Hall, 1990 ) and why London is home for most 
of these participants regardless of Brexit. While she identifies as a Londoner and 
a cosmopolitan in terms of how Brexit may affect her life prospects in Britain, she 
does consider what impact this may have on Serbia and thus also expresses a na-
tional identity in this more global context. 
London is not only home for those – mainly third wave and some from the 
second wave – who mainly voted Remain, it is also home for those who voted 
Leave, mainly from the first wave and some within the second wave. Although all 
of the participants show a fascination with the city, unlike the Remain voters, who 
primarily perceive London as cosmopolitan, the Leave voters appreciate London 
as British. As an account from one participant illustrates: “London can be every-
thing and anything, whatever you make of it” (Alexandra, 40 years old, second 
wave), evoking the words of Peter Ackroyd in his biography of London that “one 
could become anybody [in London]” (2000, p. 775). “It is in the nature of the city 
to encompass everything… It is illimitable. It is infinite London”, writes Ackroyd 
(2000, pp. 778–779). Given these limitless opportunities and ways in which peo-
ple can be in the city and live in the city, in this study London has the ambivalent 
role. The findings seem to reaffirm Young’s arguments about “the ideal of city 
life” as “the being together of strangers” (2011, p. 237) that accommodates all 
different ways of life and being, and what Kevin Robins implies about London as 
“a cognitive model” or “a tool for thought”: a certain way of thinking about differ
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ence (2001, p.87). This explains London’s ambivalent role and, importantly, why 
London is home.
In the summer of 2017, I was invited for dinner at Ivan’s home in South-West 
London.Ivan (50 years old) came to London in the early 1980s when he was in his 
twenties. Today he runs his own company and enjoys a middle-class lifestyle. A 
Serbian satellite channel was on television in the background. At the dinner ta-
ble, he was recalling his adventures from around Europe and suddenly exclaimed: 
“The problem you have when you live in London is that every other place becomes 
boring”. However, if this comment is observed in context alongside other insights 
from my fieldwork, one is able to see the bigger picture and come to understand 
that London is primarily seen and appreciated as “British”, as his following com-
ment may reveal: “Whenever I go to Serbia, I eat eggs with bacon and beans, which 
most people there don’t understand”. This was, then, followed by further com-
ments about his views of Brexit:
I voted for Britain to leave the EU. This mess has to stop. This city has changed 
so much in the last two decades. Now you have ghettos all around London.
Likewise, Norman (40 years old, second wave), already introduced in this paper, is 
also fond of London, but it is the “British aspect” of the city that he appreciates, as 
the following quote exposes:
When I arrived here there was almost no place where you could find espresso; 
there were only pubs. Now you have too many cultures here that have changed 
London and Britain. I like British tradition, but it’s been fading away. There are 
too many influences of other cultures. That is why I voted for Brexit.
When I met Kate (29 years old, second wave) a few weeks before the referendum , 
she told me she was into two minds about how to vote, but her mother and sister, 
who also lived in Britain, were decided and would be voting to leave the EU. She 
then added she was more likely to vote to leave too. On the same occasion, she 
was telling me that her family enjoyed British tradition and customs very much. 
The whole family moved to the UK in the mid-1990s, when she was young. Some 
of her social media posts, such as of those about attending the Henley Regatta 
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(see Figure 2)1, also reveal an admiration 
for British culture as well as her insider po-
sition as someone who can experience a 
high-class British lifestyle.
These insights may suggest that an op-
posite dynamic to Spivak’s (1987) strategic 
essentialism is at play here. Even though 
there is some evidence that migrants, and 
in particular (South-)Eastern European 
migrants, have been subjected to discrimi-
nated since the early 2000s (Fox et al., 2015) 
and arguably especially so, in the wake of 
the Brexit vote, this did not lead to an ex-
pression among this group of strategic es-
sentialism as conceptualised by Spivak.
Rather than perceiving some of these participants’ views of Brexit as an oppo-
site dynamic to Spivak’s strategic essentialism, I would argue that their attitudes 
may, in fact, be just another (negative) face of this strategy, similar to as Spivak 
(1989) was later concerned about. Older migrants can start viewing newer mi-
grants unfavourably, partly as a strategy for reinforcing their own membership in 
a host society and reasserting their status as insiders – a strategy for coping with 
difference. In this way, they strive to reaffirm their position as “British”. 
As a South-Eastern European myself, since early December 2015, I have expe-
rienced discrimination three times on the basis of my origins. Just a few days after 
the EU referendum vote, I was at the Wimbledon 2016 tennis tournament, wait-
ing for a match to start. There was a couple in their early sixties from continental 
Montenegro sitting next to me. We started talking, and they mentioned that they 
had immigrated to Britain in the 1980s. In spite of having migration histories them-
selves, and in spite of having similar origins, they did not look at me favourably 
when I said I was not in London only for a short visit. In fact, they then followed up 
with a comment that I might have to leave the country.
The first time I had a similar experience was in December 2015, before the 
referendum vote. At a business Christmas party, a gentleman in his seventies 
approached me and asked if I was a Pole or a Romanian because of my accent. 
Figure 2: Kate, Henley Regatta. Source: Instagram
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He then continued by complaining that the London underground had got very 
crowded because of all the Eastern European migrants who were pouring into 
the city, concluding with the remark that I should go back “because my country 
needs me”. In her study of Serbian Londoners, Mavra notes that some of her par-
ticipants reported they were discriminated against because they were grouped 
into the generic ‘Eastern European’ category, and because of their Slavic accent 
some thought they were Polish while they were talking on the phone in the street 
(2013, p.29).
Shortly after the referendum, in mid-July 2016, I was travelling to coastal Mon-
tenegro from Gatwick airport and while queuing for check-in was having a pleas-
ant chat with an English couple in their sixties about travels, until they realised 
that I actually lived in London and would be coming back after a short summer 
vacation in Montenegro. Then they suddenly changed their tone, all the playful-
ness and light-heartedness disappeared in the blink of an eye, and we started to 
talk about Brexit.
In their study of Hungarian and Romanian diasporas in Bristol, Fox, Moroşanu 
and Szilassy (2015) find that these people often deny that they have experienced 
discrimination and instead embrace the meritocratic values of a higher social 
class than their own and point towards their higher racial status as White Euro-
peans, in order to “…reposition themselves more favourably in Britain’s racialised 
status hierarchies” (2015, p. 730). However, they conclude that while these coping 
mechanisms may help navigate through this hierarchical system of the privileged, 
they are more likely to legitimise than to challenge discrimination in the long term. 
This is why the strategy is normatively and effectively different from strategic es-
sentialism as conceptualised by Spivak (1987) or from the politics of difference, 
as set out by Young (2011 [1990]), which essentially aim to reassert difference as 
a positive cultural identity, because everyone is just as specific as everyone else 
(Young, 2011 [1991]). 
However, this theory alone cannot account for the Remain and Leave votes, 
because people have different dispositions towards the nation. No identity is un-
contested (see Bonikowski, 2017; Hall, 1990 ; Gilroy, 1987; Morley, 1992), and Serbs 
have always been divided in terms of their national identity. As explained, before 
1990 they were divided into supporters and opponents of Tito’s regime (Chetniks 
and Yugoslavs), in the 1990s into supporters and opponents of Milosevic’s regime 
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(First and Other Serbias). Hence, these findings reaffirm Bonikowski’s argument 
that people within one nation may be differently disposed towards the nation.
Conclusion
This paper has made three main arguments. First, it has shown that migrants, like 
nations, are not a coherent whole. There is no one single Serbian diaspora in Lon-
don. Due to their different personal backgrounds, complex motives for migration 
and disparities between different forms of capital and social class, any attempt to 
categorise these people as economic or lifestyle migrants would be an oversimpli-
fied and inaccurate representation of the richness of their experiences and identi-
ties. In relation to the question of Brexit, differences among Serbian Londoners 
mean they were divided on Brexit.
Second, this paper has argued that the Leave vote was much more motivated 
by cultural changes than by economic positioning. In contrast to the data avail-
able about the general UK adult population and subsequent studies on Brexit, 
income was not the main determinant of voting intentions. In most cases, a more 
significant factor was a system of values that was more closely related to cultural 
and social capital. Education as one form of cultural capital also cannot explain 
the voting choice on its own but has to be analysed in relation to social capital. In 
this sense, the division into “First” and “Other” Serbias is a much better explanato-
ry variable, with those who identified with the former more likely to support Brexit, 
whereas the latter were more in favour of Remain.
Finally, this paper has drawn on these insights to explain whether and how 
Brexit may have influenced the way these people identify and their sense of be-
longing. Most of my respondents consider London their home or one of their two 
homes (along with Serbia). While Remainers tend to emphasise London’s cosmo-
politan character, Brexiteers appreciate London’s Britishness. Hence, London’s 
ambivalent role is what enables the city to be perceived as home in the context of 
Brexit. The paper has also considered whether Spivak’s (1987) concept of strategic 
essentialism can be applied to understanding attitudes and identities of these re-
search participants in the wake of Brexit. It has tried to explain the Leave vote by 
drawing on the already-mentioned division into “First” and “Other” Serbias, but 
also as a strategy for coping with a fragile position of in-betweenness. The paper 
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has argued that the underlying aim among some Leave voters was to reinforce 
their “insider position” as British and their membership of British society. 
Endnotes
1 Henley Royal Regatta is an annual summer rowing event taking place on the River 
Thames in the town of Henley-on-Thames, England.
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